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THE SECURITIES ARBITRATORS'
NIGHTMARE*
Constantine N. Katsoris**
I. Introduction
As the public increasingly invests in the securities markets-directly
or indirectly through IRAs, Keogh plans and other pension devices-
litigation between the public and members of the securities industry
has mushroomed. The cases litigated number in the thousands every
year.' These disputes, however, are being channeled into arbitration
with greater frequency. Forums for arbitration have been established
by the various Securities Regulatory Organizations (SROs) such as
the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of
Securities Dealers. 2 Arbitration provides the advantage of speedy
dispute resolution by persons knowledgeable in the area, without
excessive costs. Unless arbitration procedures are fair both in fact
and in appearance, their present popularity as a means of resolving
securities disputes will be greatly diminished.
In the last few years, however, the arbitration of public securities
disputes has become more complex. Aside from the usual problems
* Based upon comments delivered by Constantine N. Katsoris as a Panelist
at the National Topical Forum (Byrd's Eye View of Arbitration) of the Securities
Industry Association in New York on September 19, 1985.
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 1953, Fordham
University; J.D., 1957, Fordham University School of Law; LL.M., 1963, New York
University School of Law; Public Member of Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA) since its inception in 1977; Public Member of National Arbi-
tration Committee of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 1975-
1981; Public Arbitrator at New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) since 1971; Public
Arbitrator at NASD since 1968; Arbitrator for First Judicial Department in New
York since 1972.
1. See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS A-9 (March 31, 1984)
(during twelve-month period ended March 31, 1984, over 3,000 securities and
commodities exchange civil actions were filed in federal district courts).
2. See FOURTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION STATISTICAL REPORT Exhibit A (Nov. 1984) (available at Fordham Urban
Law Journal office). The Securities Regulatory Organizations include the following
members: American Stock Exch.; Boston Stock Exch.; Chicago Bd. Options Exch.;
Cincinnati Stock Exch.; Midwest Stock Exch.; Municipal Sec. Rulemaking Bd.;
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.; New York Stock Exch.; Pacific Stock Exch.;
and Philadelphia Stock Exch. Id. at 12. The bulk of this arbitration is conducted
by the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange.
Id. Exhibit A.
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of arbitration procedure and enforcement, questions arose as to the
arbitrability of federal securities claims and the handling of the
joinder of arbitrable with non-arbitrable claims in the same pro-
ceeding. The United States Supreme Court3 recently held that such
claims must be tried separately; but, in so holding, it left several
questions unanswered. The purpose of this Article is to discuss some
of those questions.
II. Enforceability of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Most arbitration between an investor and his broker is brought
pursuant to an arbitration agreement executed at the time a customer
opens an account with his broker. Securities investors are often
required, as a condition to opening an account with a broker-dealer,
to sign an agreement to arbitrate future disputes.' Under the United
States Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act),5 agreements to arbitrate
future disputes are, in general, specifically enforceable. 6 A stay of
3. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); see infra notes
28-31 and accompanying text.
4. The standard arbitration clause "authorizes the customer to elect the ar-
bitration forum from a list of several organizations. If the customer does not elect
the forum, within five days after receipt from the broker-dealer of a notification
requesting such election, the broker-dealer becomes authorized to make the election."
SEC Exch. Act. Release No. 15984 n.4 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in 17 SEC Docket
1167, 1169 n.4 (June-Aug. 1979). The extent to which customers are, as a practical
matter, "required" to sign what can basically be described as a typical industry-
wide agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause is a critical question.
This is particularly so if "the customer may be precluded from doing business
with the broker-dealer" because "he or she refuses to sign the agreement or the
broker-dealer is unwilling to accept any modification of its terms." 17 SEC Docket
at 1169. It would appear that such agreements are largely in effect with respect to
margin, option and commodity accounts, and, to a lesser degree, cash accounts. See
Stansbury & Klein, The Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes: A Summary of
Developments, 35 ARB. J. 30, 32 (1980). As to the presently prevailing practice in
opening new accounts, however, the author's "horseback" survey indicates that
customers' agreements containing pre-dispute arbitration clauses are still generally
required in opening margin, option and commodity accounts, but not necessarily
for cash accounts. This difference probably stems from the fact that the former usually
involve an extension of some form of credit by the firm to the customer, thus in-
creasing the need for speedy resolution of problems through arbitration.
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
6. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides: "A written provision in . . . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." Id. § 2 (emphasis added). Because the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to claims arising from transactions involving interstate
commerce, id., and because securities dealings usually involve such transactions,
[Vol. XIV
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litigation pending arbitration is also provided for under the Arbi-
tration Act.7 Similarly, most states recognize valid arbitration agree-
ments, and have enacted statutes setting forth procedures to implement
them. 8
A. Wilko Exemption
In Wilko v. Swan,9 however, the United States Supreme Court
was faced with the issue of whether a broker could bind a customer
to arbitration under such an agreement if the customer's claim arose
under the "special" provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act). 10 After recognizing these "special" provisions of the 1933 Act,
state securities claims, as well as those arising under the federal securities laws,
are usually arbitrable. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
17. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). The purpose of this section is to allow parties to
a contract to select a less costly alternative to litigation and then to proceed in
that alternative forum without delay. Trade Arbed, Inc. v. S/S Ellispontos, 482
F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
8. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518 (1982 & Supp. 1985);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-88.8 (West 1982 &.Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 52-408 to -424 (1960 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-25
(1975 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp.
1984). The Supreme Court has stated that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-14 (1982), creates a substantive rule that is applicable in state courts as well
as in federal courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1984); see
Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). The Court
has further stated that Congress "intended to foreclose state legislative attempts
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." Southland, 465 U.S. at
16; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 105 S. Ct. 3346,
3353-54 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 25 (1983); see also COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AN OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE UNDER NEW YORK
ARBITRATION LAW 15-16 (Dec. 1970) (discussion of whether Congress' intent in
passing the Federal Arbitration Act was to create a national substantive law that
is applicable to states).
9. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
10. 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)). The
Court noted that the Securities Act was designed to protect investors from fraud
by requiring full disclosure on the part of the dealer. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 431 (1953). In order to effectuate this policy, Congress, in section 12, specifically
gave investors a special right to recover for misrepresentation which differs sub-
stantially from the common-law action in that this special right imposes upon the
seller the burden of proving lack of scienter. Id.; 48 Stat. 84 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982)). The Court further noted that under section 14 of the
Act, 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)), an investor could not waive
this special right; and, that section 22 of the 1933 Act specifically affords to the
plaintiff national service of process and a broad choice of forum by making the
right enforceable by the investor in any court of competent jurisdiction-federal
or state. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35; 48 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a) (1982)).
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the Court noted that the essential purpose of the Arbitration Act
was to avoid the delay and expense of litigation," whenever possible,
in controversies involving statutes as well as those involving case
law;' 2 whereas, the purpose of the 1933 Act was to provide a judicial
forum for the resolution of securities disputes.
Faced with these two conflicting policies, the Court concluded
that although the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
might be economically advantageous, 3 Congress' desire to protect
investors would be more effectively served by holding invalid any
pre-dispute arbitration agreements relating to issues arising under
the 1933 Act.' 4 In effect, the Court in Wilko concluded that the
nonwaiver provision of section 14 of the 1933 Act, 5 in conjunction
with the special rights provision of section 12 6 and the special process
and forum provisions of section 22,'1 implicitly repealed the Arbi-
tration Act with regard to securities claims arising under the 1933
Act.'8
Nothing that has been said about pre-dispute arbitration clauses,
however, prevents an investor from consenting to submit to arbi-
tration an existing controversy with a broker-dealer.' Moreover, the
limitation on pre-dispute arbitration clauses in securities disputes
does not extend to state claims.2° Indeed, "the arbitrability of claims
arising under state statutory or common law is determined solely
by reference to either state arbitration law or the Federal Arbitration
A c t . , 2 1
11. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
12. Id. at 432.
13. Id. at 438.
14. Id.
15. 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
18. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
19. "The principle that emerges from the cases evaluating the validity of ar-
bitration clauses is that, while a waiver in futuro will not be permitted under
Wilko, an agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute made when a party has full
knowledge of the facts therein will be excepted from the Wilko doctrine." Malena
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 91,492, at 98,449 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1984); see Tullis v. Kohlmeyer
& Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 1977).
20. See Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 694 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as KRAUSE].
21. Id. at 694-95.
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B. Wilko Application To 1934 Act?
Most federal securities claims brought against brokers by the
public, however, are brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act).22 The reason for this is that, unlike the 1933 Act
which is concerned with the initial distribution of securities,2 3 the
1934 Act deals principally with post-distribution trading.2 4 Despite
this difference, many Federal Courts presumed that the Wilko pro-
tection extended to the 1934 Act, and thus refused to order arbi-
tration-under pre-dispute arbitration agreements-of customers'
claims arising under the 1934 Act.25
C. Mixed Claims
The issue regarding the Wilko extension to claims under the 1934
Act is further exacerbated when a public customer joins a non-
22. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
23. The Securities Act of 1933 provides for civil liability. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k,
771, 77o (1982). The 1933 Act is concerned primarily with the initial distribution
of securities and requires full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities
sold to the public. See Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability-How Far Do
We Go?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 208-09 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Katsoris
I].
24. Liability under the Exchange Act is generally founded on section 18, 15
U.S.C. § 78r (1982), and the implied provisions of section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1982), and the Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240 (1985). Most 1934 Act investor claims against brokers, however, involve
section 10(b) of the Act. Bell & Fitzgerald, Mixed Arbitrable/Nonarbitrable Disputes,
16 REV. SEC. REG. 849, 851-52 (1983); see Katsoris 1, supra note 23, at 214.
25. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir.
1979) (arbitration agreement overridden by anti-waiver provision of federal securities
laws); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-
29 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 & n.12 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265,
268 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (same). But see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 513-14 (1974) (arbitration agreement enforced to avoid uncertainty in inter-
national transaction involving foreign contractor); Katsoris, The Arbitration of a
Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 301 (1984) ("although Scherk
involved a lOb-5 [1934 Act] claim arising out of an international securities trans-
action, the Court's suggestion that the Wilko prohibition be limited to 1933 Act
claims should be followed in domestic cases as well") [hereinafter cited as Katsoris
ll]; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1244 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring) (While Justice White stated that "Wilko's reasoning cannot be me-
chanically transplanted to the 1934 Act," the full court has not yet ruled on this
issue. See infra note 29.); Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,399, at 92,451 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1985); see also Palmer,
Arbitration of Securities Complaints, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 9, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
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arbitrable Wilko claim with an arbitrable non-federal securities claim.
Some courts bifurcated the two and ordered that the Wilko claim
be litigated and the other claim be arbitrated.2 6 Other courts, however,
found the two claims to be so intertwined that it was impractical
or impossible to separate them and, therefore, ordered that both be
litigated together. 7
The recent case of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,2 involving
1934 Act claims joined with arbitrable non-federal securities claims,
raised two issues: 1) whether Wilko extends to 1934 Act claims, and
2) whether the claims should be bifurcated or intertwined. Although
the Court declined to specifically resolve the issue of whether Wilko
applies to 1934 Act claims, 29 it did hold that when an arbitrable
claim is joined with a non-arbitrable Wilko claim, it would not
order the two be involuntarily tried together, even though they were
intertwined.
Thus, Byrd rejected the concept of intertwining and supported
the principle of automatic bifurcation,30 when a non-arbitrable Wilko
claim is joined with an arbitrable claim. In other words, the two
claims could be tried separately and simultaneously. Whatever the
merits of automatic bifurcation, it unleashes and sets two separate
forums on a collision course. At the very least, it greatly complicates
the task of arbitrators, who generally are not lawyers. This is
particularly true since the Byrd court did not decide the issue of
whether the Wilko prohibition as to 1933 Act claims also applies
to the far more numerous claims by the public under the 1934 Act.
That issue will be decided, eventually, by the United States Supreme
Court. It is the author's opinion that Wilko should not apply to
the 1934 Act.' Until the Supreme Court decides, however, arbitrators
will not know and thus, they must consider both scenarios.
26. See Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 31 (E.D.
Cal. 1974) (arbitrable contract claim severed from a Rule lOb-5 claim); Krause,
supra note 20, at 710 (arbitrable pendent claims should be severed and proceed
to arbitration).
27. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981); Sibley
v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977).
28. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
29. The Court declined because Dean Witter did not seek to compel arbitration
of the federal securities claims at the district court level. Id. at 1240 n.l.
30. See Pitt, 'Byrd': First Step to Heighten Role of Arbitration, Legal Times,
March 11, 1985, at 15, col 1.
31. See Katsoris II, supra note 25, at 301.
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I11. Arbitrators' Dilemma
A. Assuming Wilko's Applicability
First, assuming that Wilko does apply to 1934 Act claims, a flood
of simultaneous bifurcated litigation will result-one action in court,
the other in arbitration. This causes many problems for the average
arbitrator. For example:
a) It could raise annoying issues of adjournment and/or har-
assment due to the fact that discovery and depositions in the
litigation are being conducted at the same time as the arbitration
proceeding.
b) Complicated issues of collateral estoppel and res judicata
are also certain to surface.3 2 Renowned legal scholars of practice
and procedure cautiously approach the subject of collateral es-
toppel and res judicata."- Arbitrators will approach it even more
cautiously.
In any event, at least three distinct possibilities34 arise from simul-
taneous arbitration and litigation of bifurcated claims:
a) the arbitrators will decide their case first;" or, b) the court
will decide its case first; or, c) the court and arbitrators will
decide the cases simultaneously.
It is somewhat doubtful that a prior arbitration award would have
a preclusive effect upon subsequent litigation of a federal securities
claim.36 As to the second possibility, it has been suggested that
detailed findings of fact in litigation "should eliminate much of the
32. Res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude the relitigation of a cause of
action or an issue already determined. See Note, Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel
Effect of a Court Determination in Subsequent Arbitration, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1029,
1031-36 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Effect]; see
also Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation, N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1985, at 1,
col. I (possible collateral estoppel effect of adverse decision in arbitration).
33. See, e.g., 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, JURISDICTION 1-801
(1981) (devoting over 800 pages to current federal law on the subject, "without
purporting to get into the rich and often divergent strands of state law"); C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 679 n.12 (4th ed. 1983).
34. Appeals, reversals and mistrials could further complicate and expand the
realm of possibilities.
35. Based upon present practices, it is anticipated that arbitrators would most
likely conclude their case first.
36. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); McDonald
19861
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duplication through the impact of collateral estoppel on the sub-
sequent arbitration."3 On the other hand, any strict application of
preclusion principles in arbitration can "undermine arbitration's use-
fulness and essential characteristics." 3 Finally, it is difficult to see
any preclusive effect upon either forum when a court and arbitrators
decide their respective cases simultaneously. Thus, similar or factually
related issues might still be tried in two different forums.3 9
There will surely be much written in the next few years as to the
effect of collateral estoppel and res judicata on bifurcated securities
proceedings. If some reverse logic from the Byrd case is applied,
however, it can be suggested in all three situations listed above, that
the decision of the one forum should not necessarily be preclusive
upon the other forum.
By deciding on a rule of automatic bifurcation, the court in Byrd
recognized and reinforced the existence of two "Sacred Cows",
namely: a) Wilko claims should be litigated and b) Arbitration
Agreements should be enforced.40 Admittedly, this recognition reflects
the Congressional mandates under the 1933 Act and the Arbitration
Act.4 Nevertheless, the fact remains that litigation and arbitration
clearly contravene one another.42
In arbitration the norm is speed and economy. There is no extensive
v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
We believe that the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings is sig-
nificantly less well-settled than the lower court opinions might suggest,
and that the consequences of this misconception has been the formulation
of unneccessarily contorted procedures. We conclude that neither a stay
of proceedings, nor joined proceedings, is necessary to protect the federal
interest in the federal court proceeding, and that the formulation of
collateral-estoppel rules affords adequate protection to that interest.
Dean Witter, 105 S. Ct. at 1243. But see Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (lth Cir. 1985) (district court properly required arbitrable
state law contract claims to go to arbitration despite their being intertwined with
an exclusively federal RICO claim, and nature of RICO claim asserted favored
application of collateral estoppel to arbitrator's fact findings).
37. Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981).
38. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Effect, supra note 32, at 1048. Indeed,
because arbitrators are not bound by the customary doctrines of substantive law,
it is not clear what res judicata or collateral estoppel effect arbitrators would accord
to a prior judgment. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7511, commentary of 7511:5,
at 582 (McKinney 1982) (commentary by Joseph M. McLaughlin).
39. In an era of calendar congestion, this potential for duplication and delay
is ill-advised. Automatic bifurcation also runs contrary to the federal policy of
pendent jurisdiction, which encourages parties to resolve their claims in one pro-
ceeding. See United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966).
40. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242 (1985).
41. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
42. See Katsoris II, supra note 25, at 294.
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pretrial discovery and strict rules of evidence do not apply. Arbi-
trators generally do not feel bound by the customary rules of sub-
stantive law. No written opinions are issued, and no general appeal
exists. 3 In litigation the opposite is generally true.44 Any of these
differences of evidence, procedure and substantive law could, on its
own, easily cause different findings of fact and ultimate results.
If the Supreme Court's opinion is that claims under arbitration
agreements and federal securities laws are each too "sacred" to be
intertwined and therefore must be tried separately, it is not logical
to say that the decision of the first forum to render an opinion is
preclusive on the other forum because of the principles of res judicata
or collateral estoppel-particularly if the elements of proof are
different. Yet, to leave these two "Sacred Cows" totally unbridled
will complicate, delay and often thwart justice through conflicting
and contradictory results. The opinion in Byrd left this issue largely
unresolved, but it surely will have to be addressed in the future.
In any event, arbitration as we now know it will become greatly
complicated and, in the meantime, arbitrators will be saddled with
these uncertainties.
B. Assuming Wilko Inapplicable
Assuming arguendo, that the Wilko prohibition does not apply
to the 1934 Act, more claims will surely be forced into arbitration
and, thus, the duplicative litigation of bifurcation will be avoided.
Indeed, as arbitration basically becomes the "sole game in town," 45
the courts must examine the adhesion issue more closely.
43. See id. at 285-91.
44. Id.
45. This is so because most federal securities claims arise under the 1934 Act.
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see also Powers, Arbitration After
Dean Witter v. Byrd: Is There Anything Left for the Courts, Commodities Law
Letter, Vol. V, Nos. 5 & 6, at 1, col. 2 (July/Aug. 1985). Furthermore, it is
assumed, for purposes of this discussion, that claims under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-64 (1982), will not be
unduly disruptive of the arbitration process. For a general discussion of RICO,
see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Blakey, A Vital Hedge
Against Corporate Fraud, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 2, col. 3;
Greenhouse, Business & the Law, The Argument Against RICO, N.Y. Times, Oct.
15, 1985, at D2, col. 1; O'Brien, RICO's Assault on Legitimate Business, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 2, col. 3; SaunderS, The RICO Racket Strikes Again,
Forbes, Dec. 2, 1985, at 82, col. 1; Strasser, Congress Considers New RICO Limits,
8 Nat'l L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 3, col. 2. It is doubtful that Wilko would apply
to RICO claims, since-like the 1934 Act-it lacks some of the provisions of the
1933 Act which the Court found as "special." See supra notes 15-18 and accompa-
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Adhesion arises when a standardized contract, usually drafted by
a party with superior bargaining power, is presented to a party
whose choice is limited to either accepting or rejecting the contract,
without the opportunity to negotiate its terms.4 6 Such agreements
are usually used when a party enters into similar transactions with
many individuals-and the agreements resemble ultimatums or laws
rather than mutually negotiated contracts.4 7 Such contracts, even if
they are consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, 4
will be denied enforcement if they are unduly oppressive, uncon-
scionable or against public policy. 49 Nor is this point rendered moot
by the Arbitration Act. 0 Specifically, even though this type of
transaction constitutes "commerce" and is therefore covered by this
Act, there is a specific exception when grounds exist, either at law
or in equity, for the revocation of any contract.'
What effect the doctrine of adhesion will have on the enforceability
of pre-dispute securities arbitration agreements will become more
apparent with time. If courts view standardized securities industry
Dying text; Ross v. Mathis, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,343, at 92,248 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 11, 1985). But see McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,319, at 92,140 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1985). If, however,
it should be decided that RICO rights could. not be waived in advance, then similar
problems of bifurcation would arise. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
46. M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1489
(9th Cir. 1983); Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,399, at 92,454 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1985); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS § 1-3, at 6 (2d ed. 1977); see T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST 2-302[A], at 2-95 to -96 (1978).
47. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 1955);
see Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 553 (1971).
48. Regardless of any general "duty to read," such a contract or provision
which does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or adhering
party will not be enforced against him.
Assume that a customer is required to sign an arbitration clause typical
of those found in standard broker-customer securities agreements before
he can open an account. Would a customer be relieved of his arbitration
obligation because there was no duty to read, and consequently no true
assent? Apparently not, because the investor could reasonably have ex-
pected to find a pre-dispute arbitration clause in the agreement. Would
such a clause be contrary to public policy? Again, it would appear not,
because of the policies underlying the federal Arbitration Act.
Katsoris II, supra note 25, at 307.
49. Finkle and Ross, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,399, at 92,454 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 2, 1985) (citing Katsoris I1, supra note 25, at 307); Graham v. Scissor-Tail,
Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 820, 623 P.2d 165, 172-73, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 612 .(1981).
50. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
51. Id. § 2; see supra note 6.
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contracts as presumptively unfair52 and therefore unenforceable, a
shadow will be cast over the effectiveness of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses for the foreseeable future,53 even in cases where Wilko would
be inapplicable.
The initial inquiry in the resolution of this question should be
whether the public, as a practical matter, must execute such an
agreement to have access to portions of the securities markets?54 If,
as a practical matter, the answer is yes, then the next question
becomes: is it fair to force the public into forums, administered by
the SROs, which the public "might perceive" as being influenced
by the securities industry itself?55
It has been this author's experience that securities arbitration
procedures have resulted, to date, in an overall good faith effort
to provide fair resolution of public securities disputes. Nevertheless,
regardless of individual experiences and well-meaning SROs, the issue
of adhesion will not disappear, particularly as the markets of the
52. See Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 122 Cal. App. 3d
147, 153, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (1981); Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903-04, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28-29
(1976). But see Parr v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 139 Cal. App. 3d
440, 446-47, 188 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (1983) (real party effectively rebutted
presumption of unconscionability). The court in Parr, in finding that the arbitration
procedures before the NYSE were not unfair and, therefore, the arbitration agree-
ment was enforceable, noted that the NYSE arbitration rules had been approved
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Id. at 447, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
805. Although such SEC approval may be persuasive as to the fairness of the
arbitration rules, it does not totally resolve the issue of the image of impartiality
of the various SROs that administer the rules. See infra note 55.
53. Cf. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-46, at 347 (2d. ed. 1977).
If the industries that employ standard forms do not police themselves
so as to insure inherent fairness of forms, it is likely that the courts
will increasingly refuse legal effect to non-negotiated terms of a contract
and that standardized forms, as in the case of insurance policies, dictated
by legislatures or administrative agencies.
Id.
54. Ilan v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 9319, slip op. at 12
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1985) ("1 have little doubt that few investors have sufficient
bargaining power to negotiate such clauses out of their contracts"); see supra note
4 and accompanying text.
55. See Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 122 Cal. App. 3d
147, 154, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1981). After emphasizing that it did not find
actual bias on the part of the NYSE, the Hope court pointed out that the "structure
of governance of the Exchange is such that there exists a presumptive institutional
bias in favor of member firms and members who constitute the electoral constituency
of the board." Id. (emphasis in original).
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next decade expand and become increasingly diverse and complex. 6
The controversies arising out of the handling of such transactions
will increase and become more difficult to resolve. Significant strides
have already been made in establishing uniform and fair rules of
arbitration procedure." As the door of litigation options closes, 5"
however, greater public focus will be directed to the fairness-both
in fact and in image-of the arbitration forum."
The issue of adhesion, therefore, should persist either until ar-
bitration is voluntary 6" or until a specialized independent forum"' is
provided 62 in which the public participates not only on arbitration
panels, 63 but also in the administration of the forum itself.'
4
56. See, e.g., Maidenberg, Futures/Options, Young Markets Play Key Role,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1984, at D6, col. 3.
57. See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION (as amended), reprinted in THE FOURTH
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Exhibit C (Nov. 1984) (available at the Fordham
Urban Law Journal office). For a discussion of the development of securities
arbitration, see Katsoris II, supra note 25, at 283-84.
58. This will result in litigants giving up rights such as a jury trial and extensive
pre-trial discovery. In addition, as a practical matter, the right to receive punitive
damages will also be forfeited. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Brecher, Customers' Rights, Barrons, Aug. 5, 1985, at 26, col.
1. Although it may not necessarily be representative of the public's feelings generally,
securities arbitration has been described as basically being:
limited to arbitration before a panel of brokerage industry representatives
and employees .... That is not the best forum for a customer's claims.
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds
is being relied upon by brokerage firms to obtain such arbitration and
to avoid jury trials when the customer's claims are not properly presented.
Id. at 26, col. 5. Indeed, some have suggested that securities customers should
refuse to execute mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. See id.; Meyer,
You can fight when a broker causes losses, N.Y. Sunday News, Dec. 8, 1985,
Money Talks, at 3, col. 1.
60. E.g., a warning to the customer is a prerequisite to the enforceability of
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1-26 (1982). The agreement is enforceable if: (a) executing the agreement is not
essential to gain access to the market; (b) the customer separately signs the arbitration
clause or agreement; and (c) the customer is given a warning, in bold face type,
that he is surrendering certain rights to assert his claim in court. 17 C.F.R. §
180.3(b)(1), (2), (6) (1985).
61. It is conceivable that some of the present infrastructure of one or more of
the SROs could be used.
62. This could be either in addition to voluntary arbitration or as an alternative
to voluntary arbitration.
63. It is the SRO, however, that establishes the pool of qualified arbitrators,
and it is from this pool that the SRO assigns arbitrators to the various panels.
Moreover, it is the SRO that administers its Code of Arbitration. See supra note
57 and accompanying text. The importance of the "appearance" of objectivity is
ingrained in virtually every contested event in this country, and it is inconceivable
that a lesser standard can be expected of our securities markets.
64. See Katsoris 11, supra note 25, at 312-14. An analogous concept has proved
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IV. Conclusion
One should not lose sight of the advantages of securities arbi-
tration. It provides a forum for the fair, speedy and inexpensive
resolution of disputes between a customer and his broker. The present
state of uncertainty surrounding arbitrable disputes is indeed un-
settling, and could very well lead to an undermining of the effec-
tiveness of arbitration.
Many still feel, however, that arbitration should be the primary
means of settling securities disputes. If that requires some adjustments
by the securities industry-so be it. The price will be small enough
in view of the advantages of arbitration to the industry. The public's
perception of fairness, however, must be zealously guarded, for it
extends far beyond the issue of arbitration. It goes to the very heart
of the public's trust in the securities markets themselves; and, this
trust must be preserved for those markets to stay healthy.65
Awaiting judicial and/or legislative guidance over the next few
years should prove interesting, eventful and crucial. It would be
preferable for all concerned if this comes about quickly. In the
meantime, may the Good Lord watch over the beleaguered arbitra-
tors.
workable in the accounting field. In fact, since 1977, some of the trustees of the
Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) have been selected by electors outside the
accounting profession. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATUS RE-
PORT No. 68, at 2 (June 21, 1978). "The FAF appoints, oversees and finances the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which is responsible for formulating
the rules by which companies account and report their financial condition." Katsoris
11, supra note 25, at 312 n.259. Moreover, to a lesser degree, the NASD has had
representatives from industries other than the securities industry on its National
Arbitration Committee.
65. See Katsoris, The Double Jeopardy of Corporate Profits, 29 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1, 19-21 (1980); Katsoris, In Defense of Capital Gains, 42 FORDHAM. L. REV.
1, 9-12 (1973).
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